The relationship between changes in GDP and unemployment during the 2008 financial crisis differed significantly from previous experiences and across countries. We study firm-level decisions in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. We find significant differences between the response of US and non-US firms. US firms significantly decreased their production costs relative to firms in other countries. They have also reduced debt, reduced dividend payout, and increased their cash holdings compared to firms in other countries. The differences are, in general, explained by differences in financial leverage. However, financial leverage does not explain differences between production decisions in German and U.S. firms and between Japanese and US firms. We argue that differences in firm governance between US firms and firms in Germany and Japan drive these responses. US firms are more prone to cut labor costs and reduce leverage compared to German firms and Japanese firms in order to achieve larger profits and a larger cash-cushion in the short-run. JEL Codes: E30, G01, G32, G34
Introduction
One of the interesting features of the 2008 financial crisis is the wide range of relationships between changes in a country's output and changes in unemployment as shown in Figure 1 . Spain and Ireland had very large increases in unemployment despite quite different falls in output. This is perhaps not very surprising because both had significant construction industries that were devastated by the bursting of the property bubbles in both countries. More surprising is the fact that countries like Germany and Japan had much larger drops in output than the US but the effect on their unemployment rates was small. Germany actually had a decrease in unemployment. Figure 2 shows the path of gross domestic product (GDP) for the G5 countries, France, Germany, Japan, the US and UK. It can be seen that Japan had a 10% drop in GDP between quarter 1, 2008 and quarter 1, 2009. Germany's GDP dropped more than 6%, for the UK and US it was about 5%, and for France under 4%. Figure 3 shows a dramatically different situation for unemployment. Japan's unemployment increases a small amount, while Germany's falls most of the time. France and the UK rise somewhat but by far the largest change is the US, which more than doubles from just under 5% to 10%.
Using data from quarter 2, 1947 2, until quarter 4, 1960 2, , Okun (1962 found that a 3% change in GDP was associated with a change in unemployment of about 1%. This relationship became known as Okun's law. Although it was recognized that Okun's law varied across countries and time (e.g., Lee, 2000, and Knotek, 2007) , the breakdown of the relationship during the crisis was of a different order of magnitude than what was previously observed.
There has been extensive discussion of why this change has occurred. One important point that is frequently made is that Okun's law is a statistical relationship. It is not based on a theoretical framework. There is no particular reason why the relationship should be expected to be stable. The examples of Ireland and Spain suggest that the importance of the construction industry in employment when there is a real estate bubble that bursts is a key factor. Much of the discussion has been focused on differences in labor markets. In particular, there are significant differences in employment protection law, the share of temporary workers not protected from dismissal and the generosity of unemployment insurance (see, e.g., IMF, 2010, Chapter 3). There is no consensus on the importance of these factors. Cazes and Verick (2011) , for example, conclude that it is difficult to identify a robust relationship between cross-country estimates of Okun's coefficient and labor market institutions.
One important institutional difference between the countries that has not been considered in the previous literature concerns corporate governance. In the UK and US it is quite clear that shareholders own the firm and managers have a fiduciary (i.e., very strong) duty to act in their interests. In contrast, in Germany there is co-determination. In large corporations employees and shareholders have an equal number of seats on the supervisory board of the company (see Allen and Gale, 2000) . Here workers' interests will also matter. In Japan, managers do not have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. The legal obligation of directors is such that they may be liable for gross negligence in the performance of their duties, including the duty to supervise (Scott, 1998) . In practice, it is widely accepted that stakeholder interests and in particular employee interests play a predominant role (see Dore, 2000, and Jackson and Miyajima, 2007) . The system in France is that partially privatized companies must reserve two or three board positions (depending on board size) to be elected by employees. Also, employees in companies where at least 3% of shares are employee owned have the right to elect one director (Ginglinger, Megginson, and Waxin, 2009 ). Figure 4 shows the results of a survey of managers by Yoshimori (1995) . He asked whether a company exists for the interest of all stakeholders or whether shareholder interests should be given the first priority. It can be seen that in Japan, Germany and France it is for all stakeholders while for the UK and US it is for shareholders. Figure 5 shows the results of asking managers to choose between maintaining dividend payments, even if they must lay off a number of employees and maintaining stable employment. Again there is a stark difference with managers in Japan, Germany and France choosing stable employment while in the UK and US they prefer to maintain dividends.
In this paper we take a different approach than the existing literature in that we consider the G5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US) and focus on the question of how firms in the different countries reacted to the shock that the financial crisis inflicted. The literature discussed has focused on adjustments in labor. While these are no doubt important, they represent just one margin. There are many others, including investment, financial structure, payout policy and so forth. In this paper we consider a whole range of adjustments that firms can make and that can represent important differences in the way firms react in times of crises.
To analyze firms' response to the crisis, we consider firm level data rather than aggregate data. We take firm level accounting data from Worldscope for France, Germany, Japan and UK and Compustat for the US. We focus on the largest 20% of firms in these datasets. These account for much of each country's economic activity in each of the G5 economies.
One important difference across countries is that the major industries vary considerably in size. For example the automobile industry is very important in Germany but not in the UK. To deal with this we match firms in France, Germany, Japan and the UK with similar firms by size and industry in the US. We then consider how these firms in different countries reacted to the shock of the crisis.
We find significant differences between the response of US and non-US firms. US firms significantly decreased their production costs relative to firms in other countries. They also reduced debt and dividend payout, and increased their cash holdings compared to firms in other countries.
We find that the differences are, in general, explained by differences in financial leverage between US firms and foreign firms. Higher financial leverage in US firms before the crisis made firms more vulnerable to funding difficulties in the financial markets and led to more drastic changes in their production decisions.
In our sample of firms in the five countries, we analyze the issue of how firms reacted to the negative shock of the financial crisis. We argue that financial leverage does not explain differences between production decisions in German and U.S. firms and between Japanese and US firms. Rather, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that differences in firm governance between US firms and firms in Germany and Japan drive these responses. In particular, US firms are more prone to cut labor costs and reduce leverage compared to German firms and Japanese firms in order to achieve larger profits and a larger cash-cushion in the short-run.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 considers the data that we use. Our analysis is contained in Section 3. Section 4 concludes
Data
Our data sources are the Worldscope database and the Compustat database. Worldscope collects financial statement data on public firms from around the world. We collect data for Germany, 
Sampling procedure
We require that all firms are active. We further restrict our sample to firms that do not belong to the financial sector or the public utilities sector, since these firms were either directly affected by the crisis or are restricted by regulations which affect their firm-level decisions. We focus our analysis on the largest firms in each country. We therefore further restrict the sample to firms that are ranked in the top 20% in terms of sales (in the year 2005) out of the same-country firms in the sample. The reason for this restriction is that we are interested in understanding the effect of the crisis on firmlevel decisions in the most prominent and important firms in that country. To account for the fiscal-year mismatch of Japanese firms we rely on their quarterly data.
Worldscope has a separate database in which it records financial results of Japanese firms on a quarterly basis. The coverage is almost complete for income statement variables and balance sheet variables, but is not complete for cash-flow statement variables. We therefore aggregate incomestatement variables over the four calendar quarters in order to match the income-statement variables to the end of the calendar year.
2 Similarly, we rely on the balance-sheet at the end of the fourth calendar quarter in order to match balance-sheet statement variables to the end of the calendar year.
For cash-flow statement variables we rely on the annual data. When data is not available over the four quarters, we also rely on the annual data.
For UK firms, Worldscope does not record quarterly results, only semi-annual results. We therefore do not make adjustments to UK firms. Instead, we assume that UK firms report at the end of the calendar year. We repeat the tests in the analysis part on a subset of UK firms that have a fiscal year end that coincides with the end of the year. Our results are not sensitive to restricting our sample to this set of firms.
2.3
Differences in firm mix across countries.
To ensure a meaningful comparison of firm-level decisions around the financial crisis we need to ensure that our results are not driven by firm-level differences in characteristics. Indeed, the characteristics of firms in our sample are likely to be different across countries. One reason for these differences is that we restrict ourselves to publicly traded firms. To the extent that some countries rely more on the public financial markets than other countries, our sample will capture a different fraction of economic activity across countries. We believe that this concern is mitigated by the fact that we focus on the largest firms in each country. The largest firms are more likely to be actively traded in the financial markets and more visible, and therefore are more likely to be in our sample, regardless of their country of origin.
Another reason for differences in economic activities is industry specialization across countries. For Japanese firms the variables Cost of Goods Sold and Sales General and Administration Expenses are aggregated in the quarterly statements. We therefore use an approximation procedure to disentangle the two costs. We describe this procedure in details in the appendix.
Automobile industry captures almost a third of the sales, and in Japan Automobile and Electronics industries together capture 18.2% of the sales of firms in the sample. In the US, Oil and gas as well as Automobiles are the industries with the largest sales, capturing together 19.3% of total sales.
To ensure that our results are not driven by differences on the effect of the crisis on different economic sectors, in our analysis we match firms across countries by industry and size (sales).
Analysis

3.1
Aggregate-level activity in firms across countries around the financial crisis.
The financial crisis had a stark economic effect on economic activity across countries. The decline (from the levels in quarter 1 of 2008) is in the order of 5% in the US and the UK, more than 6% in Germany, under 4% in France, and 10% in Japan. Thus, it is clear from the figure that the financial crisis hit all countries in our sample. Table 3 shows the aggregate sales activity of firms in our sample across the same period.
Consistent with the effect of the financial crisis on GDP, the table shows stark declines in sales in fiscal year 2009 from their levels in 2008. The declines are 9.3% in France, 10% in Germany, 19%
in Japan, 5% in the UK and 14% in the US. Therefore, on average, firms in our sample were affected by the economic crisis and show decrease in sales which are roughly the same order of magnitude as the decrease in GDP.
3.2
Firm-level activity across countries around the financial crisis Table 4 shows firm-level activity around the financial crisis for German (panel A), French they have increased from 70% to 71%. The UK has seen an average increase from 62% to 64%. Japan saw an increase from 76% to 80% and the US saw an increase from 68% to 69%. General Sales and Administration costs (SG&A) to Sales have increased also in Germany, Japan, and the US but remained relatively stable in the other countries.
Financial ratios have also changed during the period. Across all countries, firms have increased their cash holdings. In Germany, average cash to sales ratio has increased from 9% in 2007
to 13% in 2009. In France, it has increased from 12% to 16%, in the UK it has increased from 11%
to 12% and in Japan it has increased from 11% to 14%. The US saw the largest increase in cash holdings, from 9% in 2007 to 14% in 2009. Another notable change is leverage ratio. Firms have decreased their Long-term (LT) debt to asset ratio in France and the UK, while for Germany the average ratio has not changed, and for the US and Japan, debt ratios have increased.
On average, investment in tangible assets (change in net PP&E to Assets) has increased between 2007 and 2009. In Germany, the increase is 3% (from 60% to 63%), in France the increase is 2% (52% to 54%) and in the UK the increase is 3% (53% to 56%). Japan has increased net PP&E to Assets by 6% (74% to 80%) and the US has increased its net PP&E to Asset ratio by 4% (55% to 59%).
Clearly, firms saw changes in their production ratios, financial ratios, and investment ratios around the crisis. Our goal is to assess whether firms in different countries changed these ratios differently. A simple univariate analysis of differences in the ratios across countries is unlikely to be informative, because, as we saw, firms in different countries have different industry mixes and size mixes. We therefore match firms in one country to firms in another country by industry and size and explore differences in the ratios after the proper matching. We describe the results in the next subsection.
Analysis in differences in firm-level decisions around the crisis
Our analysis is between US firms and firms in other countries. For each firm in a given country we match a US firms which belongs to the same industry. We pick the firm from the same industry that is closest in size (2005 dollar sales) to the firm in that country. We repeat the matching for all firms in that country. We then examine differences in changes (diff-in-diff) in the firm-level ratios between the portfolio and the US-matched portfolio. We examine changes between 2007 and 2009, and between 2008 and 2009 . We present the results in Table 5 . Table 5 shows that, between 2007 and 2009, US firms saw an average decrease in returns on sales that is smaller than the decrease in returns on sales in firms in Germany, France, Japan, and the UK. However, the differences are statistically significant only against Japan. However, change in CGS/Sales has been significantly lower in the US than in the UK, France, Germany and Japan.
SG&A/Sales has increased in the US compared to the UK, France and Germany, but has decreased compared to Japan. The differences are, by and large, statistically insignificant (except for Japan).
The decreases in returns on sales are significant when comparing non US-firms to US firms between 2008 and 2009 as well. US firms see a smaller decrease in return on sales during that period.
CGS/Sales has decreased significantly more in US firms compared to non-US firms between 2008
and 2009 but changes in SG&A/Sales are not statistically different between US and non-US firms (except for Japan, which saw a significant increase in SG&A/Sales compared to US firms during that period). does not seem to be a consistent pattern of investment in the US compared to firms in other countries.
3.4
Why have production costs decreased so much in US firms compared to firms in other countries?
The previous subsection showed a clear pattern of decreased production costs in US firms compared to firms in other countries. In this subsection we examine the reason behind this difference.
Our approach in the previous section controlled for industry and size. However, there could be other differences between US firms and firms in other countries which could drive the results. One important aspect of the financial crisis is that it reduced available funds for firms. Firms that were more constrained and did not have enough cash to finance their operations might have reduced production costs in order to survive. For example, US firms were more levered than non-US firms in the period before the crisis (average leverage of 24% in 2007), and it is possible that the financial leverage was constraining them more than non-US firms.
To examine whether differences in the changes in production costs are driven by financial constraints, we run the following diff-in-diff regression:
(COGS/Salesus2009 -COGS/Salesus2007) -(COGS/Salesnon_US2009 -COGS/Salesnon_US2007) = (Cash/Sales us2007-Cash/Sales non_us2007) + (Div/Sales us2007-Div/Sales non_us2007) + (Debt/Assets us2007-Debt/Assets non_us2007) ,
where Cash/Sales, Div/Sales, and Debt/Assets are measured in 2007, before the financial crisis. The control variables capture differences in liquidity between US firms and non-US firms before the crisis. We expect firms with higher cash levels to respond less to the crisis, and firms with higher dividend payout to also respond less to the crisis, because these firms have a cash source that they can use if they have no other ways to raise capital. In contrast, we expect firms with higher leverage to respond more to the crisis. Interestingly, adding the financial-constraint variables takes away from the results for UK and France.
Therefore, it seems that differences in operational efficiency in firms between the countries can be fully explained by differences in the financial leverage of these two countries' firms. In contrast, for Germany, and Japan, the differences in COGS/Sales changes cannot be explained by differences in financial constraints.
One concern with our analysis is that we do not control for differences in firm-level economic shocks across countries. It is possible that firms in the US saw a larger economic shock than firms outside the US, which made them respond more strongly to the crisis.
To address this concern we include in the regression a diff-in-diff variable which captures differences in sales decline between US and the foreign firms between the years 2007 and 2009. To the extent that the results are driven by differences in shocks, adding this control to the regression will reduce both the economic and the statistical significance of our results. Table 8 
3.5
What can explain the drop in US costs compared to Germany and Japan? -The governance argument.
One argument for the differences in cost cutting between US firms and German and Japanese firms is that German and Japanese firms differ in their governance compared to US firms. In Germany and Japan, firms more inclined to preserve employees due to labor laws and governance structure in firms. In Germany, the goal of firms with more than 2,000 employees, dictated by law, is to combine interests of investors and employees (codetermination). In Japan, managers do not have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. The legal obligation of directors is such that they may be liable for gross negligence in performance of their duties, including the duty to supervise. In practice it is widely accepted that they pursue the interests of a variety of stakeholders.
To examine this hypothesis, we develop a variable which captures the labor-intensiveness of firms in the industry. The measure is the aggregate number of employees in a particular industry, divided by the aggregate sales in the industry -all measured over Compustat firms in the year 2007.
When this ratio is large, it means that more employees are required to generate fewer sales. Industries where more employees are required to generate fewer sales are more labor-intensive and therefore they are more likely to incur costs of replacing and firing employees -in Germany and Japan in particular.
We therefore introduce the variable in the regression. To the extent that our hypothesis is correct, this variable should bear a negative sign (which means that in more labor-intensive industries US firms are likely to reduce more costs compared to German firms or Japanese firms than in less labor-intensive industries), and would take away from the negative return, measured by the intercept.
The regression, in Table 9 , shows that, consistent with our conjecture, the labor-intensive measure bears a negative sign for both German and Japanese firms. The coefficient of the intercept, measuring unexplained difference in production costs also decreases in both regressions. The intercept completely vanishes for German firms from -1.3% and becomes positive and both economically and statistically insignificant. For Japanese firms, the intercept is slightly smaller but still significantly negative after introducing the additional control variable, suggesting that the higher costs cannot be fully attributed to firms in labor-intensive industries.
Concluding Remarks
The relationship between changes in GDP and changes in unemployment changed significantly in the 2008 financial crisis. In addition there were large differences in this relationship across countries. There has been much discussion of why this has happened based on aggregate data. Most of this discussion focused on differences in labor markets. However, adjustments in labor are only one part of the adjustment process undertaken by firms in response to the shock of the 2008 financial crisis. In this study we use firm level data from Worldscope for France, Germany, Japan and the UK and from Compustat for the US to consider a range of margins.
We find that there are significant differences between the response of US and non-US firms.
US firms significantly decreased their production costs relative to firms in other countries. They have also reduced debt, reduced dividend payout, and increased their cash holdings compared to firms in other countries. These differences exist after controlling for industry and size. We find that the differences are, in general, explained by differences in financial leverage between US firms and foreign firms. Higher financial leverage in US firms before the crisis made US firms more vulnerable to illiquidity in the financial markets and led to more drastic changes in their production decisions.
However, financial leverage does not explain differences between production decisions in German and Japanese firms compared to US firms. We argue that differences in firm governance between US firms on the one hand and German and Japanese firms are consistent with these responses. In particular, US firms are more prone to cut labor costs and reduce leverage compared to German and Japanese firms in order to achieve larger profits and larger cash-cushion in the short-run. Whose Company is it? Figure 5 Job Security or Dividends?
